Transnational corporations and conflict prevention : The impact of norms on private actors by Rieth, Lothar & Zimmer, Melanie
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. 43 
 
Lothar Rieth, Melanie Zimmer 
 
Transnational Corporations and Conflict Prevention: 
The Impact of Norms on Private Actors 
 
 
Center for International Relations/ 
Peace and Conflict Studies, 
Institute for Political Science, 
University of Tübingen 
 
 
Adress: Melanchthonstr. 36, D-72074 Tübingen 
 
Phone: +49 (0)7071 29-78372 
 
Fax: +49 (0)7071 29-2417 
 
Homepage: http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/ib 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: Lothar Rieth, Melanie Zimmer 
  
 
Tübingen 2004 
 
 
ISBN 3-927604-40-2 
 
 
Editor in Chief:  Volker Rittberger 
 
Associate Editor:  Matthias Staisch 
 
Managing Editor:  Lisa Stengel 
Abstract 
 
Increasingly, scholarly attention has been devoted to economic dimensions of civil wars 
and especially the involvement of corporate actors in regions of conflict and their role in 
conflict prevention. When looking at the behavior of TNCs in the extractive industry in 
different zones of conflict, very different reactions can be recognized: Some leave, others 
stay, and some TNCs become actively engaged in conflict prevention. This paper argues 
that in some cases TNCs engage in conflict prevention because they have adopted a 
corporate social responsibility norm over time. TNCs go through different phases within 
a norm socialization process: First being guided by a logic of consequences, then 
becoming “self- entrapped” in justifying their (non-)role in a conflict, and, in a later 
phase, gradually accepting some responsibility in a conflict zone. This phase evenutally 
leads to initiatives and measures contributing to conflict prevention.  
This increase in conflict prevention measures undertaken by TNCs is influenced by three 
factors: Activist pressure, reputational concern and the legitimacy of a corporate social 
responsibility norm. These arguments are applied to one of the most prominent cases of 
TNC involvement in a conflict zone: Shell in Nigeria. It is demonstrated how Shell 
changed its policy over time by improving on building human capital (e.g. by supporting 
community development projects) and by improving on their human rights record (e.g. by 
minimizing human rights violations around their drilling holes and pipelines).  
The paper provides not only insights into the complementary nature of the logic of 
consequences and logic of appropriatenes, but also by looking at TNCs’ actions within 
and between the different phases, it specifies the process of norm socialization of TNCs.  
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1. Introduction1 
 
The business community, including transnational corporations (TNCs)2, contractors and 
suppliers, have realised that conflict and gross human rights violations in conflict zones3, 
failed states and states governed by repressive regimes can have significant negative 
impacts on their own business activities. From a ”conventional point of view” it is 
expected, that a responsible chief executive officer of a TNC applying a cost-benefit 
analysis would emphasize the risk of losing all investments and therefore recommend to 
end engagement and consequently exit a conflict zone. However, the reaction of TNCs in 
conflict zones does not follow this uniform pattern. Instead very dissimilar outcomes can 
be observed. Taking the extractive industry as an example, the various behavioral options 
of TNCs can be illustrated with the following examples. 
The Canadian oil TNC Talisman Energy was heavily critizised because of its complicity 
in human rights abuses in Sudan. Despite the confirmation of its complicity by a 
Canadian Government Report, Talisman insisted that its investments do contribute to 
economic growth and development in Sudan. Nevertheless, after sustained pressure by 
different civil society actors and some efforts of self-regulation the company finally 
decided to withdraw from Sudan in 2002 and sold all assets to an Indian oil company 
(Gagnon, Macklin, Simons 2003; Harker 2000). 
TNCs operating in Burma have been the target of a large divestment campaign mainly 
coordinated by American universities since the beginning of the reign of the military 
regime in the early 1990s. Many TNCs, among others Levi Strauss, Macy’s and the oil 
TNCs Texaco and Amoco, have withdrawn form Burma since the start of the campaign. 
Yet, the American oil TNC Unocal as one of the largest American investors in Burma is 
suspected to put up with violations of human rights, such as human displacement, forced 
labor and the indiscriminate use of force by security forces against the civilian 
population. Despite this heavy criticism by NGOs and pending trials in the US, Unocal 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Virginia Haufler, Carmen Huckel, Volker Rittberger, Thomas Risse and 
Matthias Staisch for their detailed and insightful comments on previous drafts. Earlier versions of this 
paper were presented in a seminar at the Centre for International Relations of the University of 
Tuebingen (16 January 2004), at the 6th Junior Conference of the German Political Science 
Association (DPVW) in Buchenbach, Germany (1 February 2004) and at the 45th Annual Meeting of 
the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada (17 March 2004).  
In addition, the final version was discussed with Shell International Petroleum Company Limited in 
London, United Kingdom with detailed written comments provided on 29th May.  
2 According to the consensus definition agreed upon by the Commission on Human Rights/ Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the term ”transnational corporation” 
refers to an “economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities 
operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or 
country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively” (United Nations 2002).  
3 The term ”conflict zone” is frequently found in discussions on business and conflict. However, there 
is no consensus definition available. In this paper the term conflict zone is used to refer not only to 
situations of armed conflict, but includes situations of political conflict below the threshold of 
violence that are on the verge of becoming violent.   
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continues to operate in Burma (Spar 1998; Spar, La Mure 2003).  
Another example is the British oil TNC British Petroleum (BP). Notwithstanding 
problems and charges of its involvement in human rights violations, BP remains invested 
in Casanare, Colombia and tries to engage in conflict prevention. It conducts workshops 
and public meetings with local communities and works in a tri-sector partnership with the 
World Bank’s Partners for Development to stabilize the local social and financial 
environment (Gerson, Colletta 2002: 20).  
As a final example, following a similar pattern of events, two other major corporations of 
the extractive sector, Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco, who have also faced a number 
of allegations for exacerbating conflict and human rights, co-operate with the World 
Bank by financing the Chad/Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project (Polity IV Project 2002). 
A preliminary result which can be deduced from these examples is that TNCs 
demonstrate very different patterns of behavior in conflict zones. Some TNCs focus only 
on direct business interests and leave when the overall conditions deteriorate, others 
move beyond isolated core business activities and engage, in one way or another, in 
conflict prevention.  
The impression arises that corporations show a tendency to tackle the issue on a case-by-
case basis, depending on the different problems at hand (Wenger, Möckli 2003: 163). 
This is due to the very complex and intricate situation found in conflict zones in general, 
where it is very difficult for TNCs to successfully manage the different dilemmas they 
face.  
It is notable that in a few cases TNCs have co-operated with other corporations or other 
actors that are involved in the conflict. So far, these instances have not been well-
documented. Neither practitioners nor academics have analyzed these examples in such 
way, so that TNCs and stakeholders in other situations can benefit from it.4 Civil society 
organisations often refer to the wrongdoings of TNCs, in particular in the extractive 
industry, without offering concrete solutions. Academics as well have so far largely 
ignored the public role of private actors, especially the involvement of TNCs in conflict 
zones. Only recently some studies have analyzed the positive role(s) corporations could 
and do take on in conflicts (Gerson, Colletta 2002; Haufler 2001a; Wenger, Möckli 
2003), whereas there is still a lack of systematic empirical research in political science 
and adjacent disciplines. 
This article sheds some light on the question of why TNCs behave so differently: Some 
leave, others stay, but remain passive, and a third group becomes actively engaged in 
conflict prevention. For the purpose of this paper the option of leaving a conflict zone is 
largely neglected. The focus will be on a continuum of engagement ranging from no 
                                                 
4 First steps have been made to draw up best practice and business cases within the Global Compact 
Policy Dialogue on the role of the private sector in zones of conflict (Bennett 2002; Haufler 2002). 
The civil society organization International Alert has prepared some reports and put together lessons 
learnt in recently published reports, including also their involvement in a partnership with the oil 
industry in Azerbaidjan (Champain 2002; Frankental, House 2000; Nelson 2000). 
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engagement to extensive forms of corporate conflict prevention.5    
In order to explain this puzzle this paper shows why corporations are relevant actors in 
conflict prevention and in fact can play an active role. By drawing upon a single case-
study, it is demonstrated what sort of contributions TNCs can make in the area of conflict 
prevention (description), and it is explored why some corporations do contribute to 
conflict prevention while others do not (explanation). The focus of this paper is, in 
particular, on the impact of norms on TNCs’ behavior. It is shown that the reaction of a 
TNC to a conflict depends on the degree to which a TNC has adopted a norm of 
”corporate social responsibility”. This has led a growing number of TNCs to reflect on 
their impact of their presence in a conflict zone. By including social and ecological 
aspects and thereby applying the model of a ”triple bottom line” to their business 
activities, they have significantly changed their behavior in  conflict zones in terms of 
active conflict preventive behavior.  
 
In the following section the concept of conflict prevention is introduced. It is set out what 
conflict prevention constitutes for TNCs in empirical and analytical terms. Based on 
these considerations, an empirically informed concept of ”corporate conflict prevention” 
is presented. 
In the third section of the paper a theoretical explanation of TNCs’ behavior in conflict 
zones is introduced and a number of variables found in the literature are discussed. This 
paper focuses on the influence of norms as an independent variable with the corporate 
social responsibility norm chosen as the most relevant one. To analyze the influence of 
norms the research on the socialization of states is taken up by applying aspects of the so-
called ”spiral model” to TNCs.  
Following this line of research, different phases of the norm socialization process of 
TNCs are illustrated. The main focus is on the process of norm internalization, through 
which TNCs gradually adopt the corporate social responsibility norm and consequently 
change their behavior and practice active forms of conflict prevention.  
As one of the five big oil giants, the Royal Dutch/ Shell Group, in particular its 
involvement in Nigeria, has been chosen to demonstrate how TNCs behave in zones of 
conflict and to evaluate our theoretical argument. In the concluding section the final 
results are presented. 
 
 
 
 
2. Transnational Corporations and Conflict Prevention  
                                                 
5 In fact, there are negative and positive linkages between business and conflict. Corporations are 
accused of exacerbating, causing and prolonging conflict, i.e. identified as part of the problem in 
regions of conflict rather than as an actor that might contribute to positive change (Wenger, Möckli 
2003: 5). Being well aware of these negative linkages this paper focuses instead on positive linkages. 
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The debate on the concept of conflict prevention gained renewed attention in the 1990s. 
Having the same problems that every new concept faces, the term “conflict prevention” 
has been used in a number of ways, however, it is still far from clear what key 
components belong to the concept. In the following section, the authors’ understanding 
of the concept, namely any means to avoid tensions and disputes from escalating into 
significant violence, will be introduced. Reasons are then given for the relevance of 
TNCs to conflict prevention and various areas of corporate conflict prevention are then 
presented.  
 
2.1. What is Conflict Prevention? 
 
The nature of conflict has dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War. Looking 
at the landscape of conflict it can be inferred that most violent conflicts today are internal 
and have different causes and characteristics than international conflicts during the Cold 
War period.6 
On an international level conflict prevention has gained support after the humanitarian 
emergencies in the 1990s, for example in Somalia, Ruanda and Sierra Leone (Gardner 
2002; Matthies 2000). Since then, conflict prevention has gradually become an 
internationally accepted principle (Boutros-Ghali 1992; Gardner 2002: 160-162; United 
Nations 2000). At least two sets of arguments are introduced in favor of conflict 
prevention. First, a moral/ethical argument states that conflict prevention is humane 
because it can prevent unnecessary human suffering and death. Second, an economic-
related argument relates to the fact, that prevention is less costly than crisis management, 
which requires enormous resources for military interventions, humanitarian aid and 
reconstruction efforts.  
Although the term conflict prevention has, in recent years, circulated broadly in policy 
and academia alike, there is still a plethora of definitions available, and no consensus 
definition of the term as of yet. In this paper a broad definition is used according to the 
path-breaking report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Thus, 
conflict prevention is possible at any stage of the conflict cycle: It can either prevent the 
outbreak, or the spread or recurrence of conflict (Carnegie Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict 1997: xviii; Wenger, Möckli 2003: 33). Conflict prevention can be 
distinguished in structural and operational prevention. Operational (light or direct) 
prevention refers to measures applied in an immediate crisis in order to avoid imminent 
violence, these might include political, economic and military measures (Carnegie 
Commission 1997: 39). Structural (deep) prevention or peace building addresses the 
root causes of a conflict and aims at ensuring three interdependent conditions: security, 
                                                 
6 For an overview see Gardner (2002). 
 5
well-being, and justice for all (Carnegie Commission 1997: 69; Hamburg, Holl 1999: 
367, 371). Peace building includes such diverse strategies as establishing dispute 
resolution mechanisms and cooperative arrangements as well as meeting people’s basic 
economic, social and cultural, and humanitarian needs. Moreover, conflict prevention 
can take place on different levels including the local, national, regional, and global level. 
To prevent the use of conflict prevention as a catch-all phrase for all kinds of activities  
the use is limited to situations where there is a risk of violent expression of conflict.  
 
In addition, conflict prevention can be considered a global public good, meaning that 
more than one group of countries benefits from it and that it does not discriminate against 
any population groups or generations. A global public good can be provided by diverse 
actors (Kaul, Mendoza 2003: 95). Furthermore, it is possible to differentiate between 
intermediate and final global public goods. Final global public goods are outcomes rather 
than ‘goods’ in the standard sense. They may be tangible (such as the environment, or the 
common heritage of mankind) or intangible (such as peace or financial stability). 
Intermediate global public goods ”… contribute to the provision of final global public 
goods” (Kaul, Grunberg, Stern 1999: 13). Conflict prevention can be thought of as an 
intermediate public good that contributes to the provision of the final global public good: 
peace.7  
Traditionally the state is entrusted with public authority and with the provision of public 
goods. Peace and security are two of the most fundamental ones: 
 ”…security policy is traditionally considered to be the exclusive domain of national governments 
and too important to the immediate survival of the state to open it up to societal influence.”  
 (Rittberger, Schrade, Schwarzer 1999: 120)  
Yet in ”The Retreat of the State” Susan Strange argues that ”ungovernance” might result 
from the power shift away from the nation state (Strange 1996: 14). State actors may not 
be able, or willing, to carry out their function (to provide peace and security) properly in 
so called ”zones grises”, where: 
 ”Authority is divided between the formal institutions of the state and local potentates, chiefs or gang 
leaders; between vassal and suzerain, the responsibility for keeping order is as unclear as it was in 
the middle ages.” (Strange 1996: 189) 
This holds true not only for the national but also for the international level. The loss of 
authority on a national level cannot be compensated by international institutions. This is 
because even the international community of states is not willing (due to the lack of 
consensus among states and domestic constraints within states) and/or not able (due to 
lack of capabilities) to intervene in conflict zones. 
To close the resulting vacuum, alternative models of providing public goods in conflict 
                                                 
7 A more elaborated classification of the production cycle of global public goods has been developed 
in a UNDP follow-up project (Kaul, Mendoza 2003).  
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zones might have to include non-state actors as well. While NGOs are now considered to 
be accepted actors in the issue area of peace and security or more specifically in conflict 
prevention, private sector actors (TNCs) are usually not considered (Matthies 2000: 77-
81; Wenger, Möckli 2003: 4). 
Summing up, although states are predominantly discussed as the primary responsible 
actors for the provision of the global public goods ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘peace and 
security’, non-state actors have become increasingly important. This does not imply that 
non-state actors will replace state actors, but that it is worthwhile discussing whether 
global public goods might increasingly be achieved through a mixture of public and 
private inputs. 
 
2.2. The Relevance of TNCs in Conflict Prevention 
 
Although the concept ”conflict prevention” has gained ground in recent years, the 
international community is still in search of strategies for its successful implementation. 
This is due to occurrences of failed prevention and the consequent (re-)escalation of 
existing conflicts mainly on the African continent (Gardner 2002: 167-168). 
Academics and policy makers alike have recognized that state actors (track 1) are 
important, but not the only, relevant actors in preventing and managing conflicts and 
have focused more recently on societal actors (track 2) and their contributions. However, 
the inclusion of societal actors has mainly referred to NGOs, the media, or influential 
individuals. The potential role of business actors (track 3) is still largely unrecognised 
(Diamond, McDonald 1996). Still, in his latest report on conflict prevention Kofi Annan, 
Secretary General of the United Nations, stressed that  
 ”the international private sector can be a powerful player in situations of conflict, the understanding 
of the precise motivations and interests of the international corporate sector in such situations is still 
limited.” (United Nations 2003) 
 
Through their increasing foreign investments TNCs are in fact more often than before 
confronted with situations of internal conflicts. In many instances TNCs are also accused 
of causing, exacerbating or prolonging conflicts (Litvin 2003a), depending on the 
location and object of a conflict in relation to a company’s sphere of influence, control 
and interest. Taking conflicts over resources as an example a TNC dealing with these 
resources in its operations and making payments to one of the parties to the conflict is 
directly affected both in terms of its core business interests as well as in terms of its 
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sphere of influence.8 
One could make an attempt to specify the status and role of a TNC in a given conflict. 
This could be done by distinguishing between TNCs which are direct parties in a conflict 
or just concerned parties. Concerned parties could be differentiated on a continuum 
ranging from actively influential to marginal/uninvolved parties (Encarnacion, 
McCartney, Rosas 1990: 44). This would be an useful analytical exercise to learn more 
about the impact of TNCs on a conflict. Yet, this paper is mainly interested in the 
behavior of TNCs and the factors explaining a TNC’s behavior.9  
A conflict might not only have negative impacts on a TNC’s business activities, but 
TNCs also face additional dilemmas and demands. They are not only increasingly 
accused of being complicit in violating human rights, supporting different actors in the 
conflict, etc.. On the contrary, TNCs are often confronted with demands that they take on 
the responsibility for the provision of diverse public goods, such as education, health 
services, basic infrastructure, or even security. This is due to their importance in many 
states or regions, the large revenues they generate and the material and immaterial 
resources at their disposal.  
In referring to conflict prevention as a global public good, Hamburg and Holl argue that 
it ”should be an accepted principle that those with the greatest capacity to act have the 
greatest responsibility to do so.” (1999: 368) In failed states, in conflict zones, or in the 
absence of a functioning state, private sector actors could become a new focus of 
attention, because, among other reasons, they have the resources to provide basic public 
goods and to influence local and governmental decisions in relation to the conflict (which 
in some instances even lead TNCs to take on a quasi-governmental role). 
To sum up, private sector actors, or more specifically TNCs, can be regarded as one 
potentially powerful actor in a conflict zone. A note of caution might be important in this 
respect: It should not be expected that the conflict prevention activities of a responsible 
TNC resolve a conflict or replace the activities of other non-state and state actors, but 
rather complement the activities of others. 
 
2.3. Defining Corporate Conflict Prevention  
 
It is still ill-defined what exactly constitutes corporate conflict prevention. As a matter of 
fact, a TNC would usually not label its activities in conflict zones as ‘conflict prevention’ 
but rather as corporate social responsibility measures. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
8 The sphere of influence of TNCs is still to be clearly defined yet. The authors assume that it goes 
well beyond the rather core-business related classification by Wenger/ Möckli (2003, Chapter 5). This 
problem is also tied to the question of TNCs realm of responsibility which is also very much debated 
(see Nelson 2000: 58; Muchlinski 2003). 
9 In this respect it is more important to look at factors determining TNCs’ behavior rather than what 
role TNCs play in the conflict itself. For example the geographic impact and the severity of a conflict 
might be more important in determining TNCs’ behavior than their role in a conflict (Berman 2000). 
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 ”… conflict prevention cannot be restricted to any particular means of intervention or implementing 
actor, such as diplomats. In principle, it could involve the methods and means of any governmental 
or nongovernmental policy sector, whether labelled prevention or not …” (Lund 2002: 180-181, 
note 6) 
This does not imply that all corporate social responsibility activities of a TNC are 
”hidden” conflict prevention measures. First, conflict prevention must be tied to a 
situation where the violent expression of conflict is likely and second, corporate activities 
must somehow address this conflict. 
Three basic strategies to prevent conflict can be distinguished: First, corporations should 
comply with national and international regulations, even if host governments are not 
effectively implementing or monitoring these. Second, business should be aware of their 
socio-economic, political and environmental impacts on society and their ability to create 
or exacerbate violent conflict. They should try to minimize their negative impact, which 
means that conflict prevention measures should relate to the core business activities of 
the corporation. Finally, business should proactively create positive societal value ”by 
optimising the external multipliers of their own business operations and engaging in 
innovative social investment, stakeholder consultation, policy dialogue, advocacy and 
civic institution building, including collective action with other companies.” (Nelson 
2000: 28). These three strategies including compliance, risk minimisation and value 
creation provide a useful starting point for discussing the role of TNCs in providing the 
public good conflict prevention by ensuring security, well-being and justice for all 
(Hamburg, Holl 1999: 371). These three interdependent conditions for building peace are 
usually endangered in situations of violent conflict. Conflict prevention, then, is not only 
related to a single policy sector, but rather cuts across different major issue areas.  
 
Therefore, corporate conflict prevention can be defined as all measures and initiatives by 
a TNC on a local, regional and national level, that aim at avoiding the further escalation 
of conflict. These measures and initiatives have the goal of strengthening the capabilities 
of potential parties to violent conflicts in resolving such disputes peacefully and of 
alleviating the root causes of conflict through ensuring security, well-being and justice 
for all. At least five areas of action can be identified as relevant for pursuing this goal: 
Strengthening equitable economies, building human capital, promoting good governance 
and accountability (corporate and national level), assisting social cohesion and human 
rights, and environmental protection (Nelson 2000: 70-72). 
The strengthening of equitable economies is directly linked to the development of the 
national economy and the redistribution of benefits within the society. Corporations can 
both directly and indirectly impact this area of action, for example by paying adequate 
wages, by encouraging transparency with regard to generated tax revenues and by 
promoting a fair redistribution and/or compensation for people affected by a TNC’s 
operation. 
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Building human capital is a long-term process that focuses on the transfer of skills, 
knowledge and expertise within a society, thereby empowering people to tap their full 
potential and resolve conflicts peacefully. Corporations can contribute to this process by 
adhering to basic labor standards. They can also make social investments by providing 
material and immaterial resources for education and training as well as health and 
nutrition programmes in local communities. 
Establishing social cohesion and promoting human rights is an essential pillar of any 
peaceful society. Corporations can set and effectively monitor human rights standards in 
their own operations, including the use of security forces, and encourage the promotion 
of human rights within the broader society.  
Moreover, corporations can contribute to good governance and accountability on a 
national level by pressuring governments to follow the rule of law. One of the key 
governance issues is the matter of corruption and transparency which can be raised in 
consultations with government officials. 
Finally, environmental destruction can be a major source of conflict. The protection of 
the environment is therefore a crucial area of action through which further escalation of 
conflict can be avoided. At the very least corporations can apply international 
environmental standards to their activities and accept complaints related to these issues. 
 
Areas of Action Possible Company Indicators 
Strengthening Equitable Economies Tax Revenue Generated 
Building Human Capital Level of Social Investment 
Social Cohesion and Human Rights Existence of Human Rights Standards  
Good Governance and Accountability Consultation with Government Officials 
Environmental Protection Adoption of International Environmental 
Standards 
Table 1: Performance Indicators for Conflict Prevention Measures (adapted from Nelson 
2000: 72) 
 
Summing up, in a situation of conflict different behavioural options of TNCs can be 
distinguished. Engaging in corporate conflict prevention consists of multiple 
components. It is not an all-or-nothing issue, but rather a matter of degree. For the 
purpose of this paper corporate conflict prevention (CCP) will be operationalized and 
measured in the case study by focusing on two areas, building human capital and the 
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promotion of human rights.10 
 
3. Explanation 
 
So far only a limited number of studies have focused on explaining TNCs’ behavior in 
general and very few have looked specifically at their role in conflict zones. This analysis 
is an attempt to extend the current knowledge by concentrating on the impact of norms 
on TNCs. It is discussed whether the socialization of TNCs by the CSR norm can help to 
explain the behavior of TNCs in conflict zones. After delineating the existence and 
content of a CSR norm, a number of hypotheses are generated on the basis of the spiral 
model (Risse, Ropp, Sikkink 1999), that describe the norm socialization process of 
TNCs. 
 
3.1. Mainstream and alternative explanations 
 
Most of the existing literature on private sector actors applies a rationalist framework of 
action. Although alternative models focusing on constructivist aspects have become more 
common within the last ten to fifteen years in International Relations (IR) theory, 
rationalist approaches still tend to dominate the field.11 This argument also applies for the 
TNC related literature. Recent publications explaining TNCs’ behavior have focused on 
variables, such as political and economic risks (including regulation by state actors, NGO 
pressure, asset specificity, and competition) and reputation (Haufler 2001b; Spar, La 
Mure 2003). Although these variables have a prominent standing in the current debate, 
they still remain ad hoc hypotheses, because their causal status in explaining TNCs’ 
behavior has not been specified in empirical research. In this still evolving research 
programme other variables, such as learning, leadership and norms, have been 
mentioned, but not probed in detail so far.12  
This paper contributes to closing this research gap by integrating rationalist and 
constructivist approaches. Being aware of the fact that the conventional procedure would 
be to follow the rationalist path, based on empirical observations this convention has 
                                                 
10 This limitation is due to economical reasons. Nevertheless, the two areas of action are considered to 
be the most important. It is common in the study of TNCs to analyze their ecological impact, however 
it should be noted that TNCs’ improvements in ecological behavior may be a neccsary but not 
sufficient condition to improve the situation in a conflict zone significantly (Litvin 2003b). The 
promotion and guarantee of human rights are considered to be an essential component of any peaceful 
society. Building human capital is equally important in empowering people and creating a basis for 
long-term sustainable development.     
11 See some of the latest contributions in the field of global political econonmy (Kahler, Lake 2003; 
Koremenos, Lipson, Snidal 2001). 
12 One could make an attempt and place all possible variables mentioned so far, in either the 
rationalist or constructivist camps, but this exercise would not be very fruitful. Even if it seems to be 
tempting to score debating points in the recent rationalist-constructivist debate, the main focus of IR 
research should be to understand substantive problems in international politics (Snidal 2002: 80). 
Possible contributions will be taken up in the conclusion. 
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been superceded and instead the focus will be on the role of norms. It is argued that 
norms, through processes of socialization, have a growing influence on private actors.  
 
The impact of norms on TNCs’ behaviour has already been put forth into the debate by 
Virginia Haufler: 
 ”Finally, the larger society itself signals what is acceptable behavior and what is not, and to a certain 
degree these social norms are absorbed by management (sometimes by force, through the political-
regulatory system, but sometimes through socialization).” (1999: 202)13 
The socialization of states has become a well-established topic in IR theory. Socialization 
has been defined as a process through which actors14 should be induced into adopting 
ground rules of a global society, thereby becoming new members of an existing global 
society (Risse 2003: 119; Schimmelfennig 2003: 406). Can this knowledge on state 
socialization processes be transferred to private actors? It is argued that changes in 
TNCs’ behavior can be explained by the impact of global norms, or to be more precise, it 
will be shown to what degree the power of norms has an impact on the behaviour of 
TNCs. 
Before introducing one of the most sophisticated models of norm socialization by 
Risse/Ropp/Sikkink (1999), the spiral model, the concept of norms is briefly discussed, 
and the chosen norm of ”corporate social responsibility” is defined and specified. 
 
3.2. The Corporate Social Responsibility Norm 
 
It is assumed, that the increasing provision of the global public good ”conflict 
prevention” and of related intermediate public goods by TNCs, such as human rights, 
education, health and the promotion of good governance, are the result of the 
socialization of TNCs, i.e. TNCs having adopted a ”corporate social responsibility” 
(CSR) norm over time.  
A norm is commonly defined as a ”standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a 
given identity” (Finnemore, Sikkink 1998: 891) or, as a broad class of prescriptive 
statements – rules, standards, principles, and so forth – both procedural and substantive 
that are prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation and 
a sense that they ought to be followed (Chayes, Chayes 1994: 65). Norms cannot be 
                                                 
13 In her recent work however she mainly focused on the two more rationalist variables: risk of 
regulation and reputation (Haufler 2003).  
14 Commonly, the socialization literature in international relations mainly refers to states 
(Schimmelfennig 2003). And in cases where the concept is extended to inclucde private actors the 
research community falls short of theoretical and empirical research (Haufler 1999; Risse 2003).  
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observed directly, rather, one can only have indirect evidence of norms.15 Is it, 
considering these provisions, reasonable to speak of a corporate social responsibility 
norm?  
The term corporate social responsibility was first mentioned in the 1930s, in conjunction 
with the idea that corporate managers might consider interests other than those of their 
shareholders. This idea gained momentum as corporations expanded in terms of size and 
global market reach (Whitehouse 2003: 86). In the following decades this understanding 
led to the phenomenon of corporate giving, better known under the term philanthropy.  
Although the majority of corporate leaders saw corporate social responsibility as a duty, 
they primarily followed a limited reasoning so compellingly summarized by Milton 
Friedman ”that there is only one responsibility of business, namely to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits” (1970: 42). As a compromise a 
number of companies in North America and Europe concerned about their business 
environment decided to make philanthropic donations. These donations were based either 
on a business and a marketing strategy, or on the personal convictions of CEOs, which 
were formed through personal experiences, history and culture. 
With the emergence of the ”green movement” in Europe as well as the occurrence of a 
number of environmental disasters, such as the chemical disaster in 1984 in Bhopal or 
oilspills caused by oil tankers, such as Exxon Valdez that struck a reef before the coast of 
Alaska in 1989, the societal impact of TNCs’ activities emerged as an item on the 
political agenda. With the prominence of civil society organisations, such as Greenpeace, 
on the rise and putting pressure on TNCs to behave more responsibly, TNCs increasingly 
felt obliged to articulate their stance on issues of corporate responsibility.16  
Approaching CSR from these many different angles, a broad continuum of definitions is 
available: A minimalist conception regards corporate social responsibility as the duty of a 
corporation to create wealth by using means that avoid harm and protect, or enhance 
societal assets. This includes following multiple bodies of law and the duty to adverse 
social impacts, which basically means that they should try to internalize external costs 
(Steiner, Steiner 2003: 126, 148). A maximalist definition, mostly put forward and 
supported by NGOs, focuses on the proactive and deliberate behavior of TNCs. Alyson 
                                                 
15 There are several methods to establish an evidential base for determining the existence of a norm. 
Following a legalistic approach one looks for evidence of codified laws, such as international treaties, 
 legal acts of interational organizations and final acts of international conferences (see Boekle, 
Rittberger, Wagner 2001). Moreover, norms can be traced in patterns of communication by relevant 
actors in a given community, by some form of content analysis, discourse analysis, survey, or in-
depth interviews. A final strategy is to examine patterns in behavior and to argue these patterns reveal 
certain norms (see Herrmann 2002: 129). The last one is the most contested approach, therefore a 
combination of the first two strategies has been used for this analysis.  
16 There is even a debate about differences between the concept of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and corporate citizenship (CC), whereby CSR much rather focuses on problem-based value 
management and CC  is geared more towards rights and duties of a company as a citizien, not in a 
strictly legal sense, but much rather as a concept of citizenship-as-a-desireable-activity. It is even 
contended that CC has its origin in the anglosaxon world and CSR has its roots in Europe. Others do 
regard CC as part of CSR and vice versa. (Behrent, Wieland 2003; Habisch 2003; Zadek 2001). To 
avoid any unnessary confusion only the term CSR is used in this article.  
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Warhurst has put forward a definition along these lines, pointing to the internalization by 
the company of the social and environmental effects of its operations through proactive 
pollution prevention and social impact assessment so that harm is anticipated and 
avoided and benefits are optimized (Warhurst 2001: 61).  
The European Commission has also launched a debate on the concept of corporate social 
responsibility in 2001 and has chosen a middle course by defining corporate social 
responsibility as:  
 ”A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” (European 
Commission 2001: 6) 
In a follow-up process different stakeholders have, (at times antagonistically), voiced 
their main concerns. Yet, a large consensus was established about the main features that 
CSR should include: First, CSR constitutes behavior over and above legal requirements, 
which is voluntarily adopted by businesses. Second, it is intrinsically linked to the 
concept of sustainable development and focuses on ”the triple bottom line”, which means 
that economic, social and environmental impacts are integrated. Third, last but not least 
CSR is not an optional ”add-on” to business activities, it has to be applied to core 
business activities (European Commission 2002; 2001).  
Owing to the fact that the debate on CSR is still developing, the consensus definition of 
the European Commission is being used for the purpose of this analysis. Considering the 
definitional problem stated in the beginning of this section, the question remains open 
whether one can speak of a ”corporate social responsibility norm”.  
The concept of CSR incorporate the idea that TNCs follow a certain standard of 
appropriate behavior or prescriptive statements, that carry a sense of obligation to engage 
in ethical practices. Going beyond a loose definition of CSR that simply encourages 
corporations to abide by existing legal obligations, social mores and voluntary schemes, 
more substantive aims of CSR focus on two interrelated goals. First, corporations should 
redistribute losses and pay or compensate for the damage they cause (distributive), and, 
second, following the ”do no harm”-approach, corporations should deter such losses 
from being occasioned in the first place (reductive) (Whitehouse 2003: 95).  
As Haufler has shown, many attempts have been made in the past decade to devise CSR 
instruments governing the behavior of TNCs (Haufler 2003: 235 ff.). The existence of 
more than 200 current CSR initiatives and countless partnership projects are reliable 
indicators that the CSR norm is gaining momentum (Gordon 2001). A number of 
business associations, such as the Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) or the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), as well as national and 
international governmental initiatives, such as in the case of the United Nations Global 
Compact, signal support for an emerging CSR norm. Moreover, in a recent survey an 
increasing number of TNCs have reported that CSR is a significant factor in determining 
where, and with whom, they do business (Berman, Webb 2003: 2-3). In addition, a 
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majority of companies reported that, in new venture assessments, CSR issues are at least 
as influential as traditional considerations, such as cost, quality and delivery. For these 
reasons CSR can be considered a norm.  
The CSR norm consists of a combination of well-known principles in the areas of human 
rights, labor and environment, which each for themselves enjoys a wide acceptance in the 
international community of states today. The CSR norm builds on these widely accepted 
principles, which can also be found in international legal documents, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development. The CSR 
norm transfers some of these responsibilities to TNCs, though the content of the norm is 
in the process of being defined, i.e. the CSR norm is underspecified (Legro 1997: 34).  
 
To explain the growing importance of single norms Finnemore and Sikkink have 
introduced the concept of a norm life cycle consisting of three phases: norm emergence, 
norm cascade and norm internalization (Finnemore, Sikkink 1998: 895). This model 
looks at the development of a norm within a community of states. This concept can be 
intuitively applied to human rights norms, labor norms and norms concerning ecological 
standards. Referring to these norms, it can be reasonably argued that, for states, the stage 
of norm cascade has been reached.  
Transferring the argument of a norm life cycle to TNCs, it appears that the CSR norm is 
still in the first stage ”norm emergence”.17 Based on the information screened, the CSR 
norm has not yet reached the stage of a norm cascade.18 
Before presenting the spiral model as a starting point to analyze whether the CSR norm 
has an impact on TNCs’ behavior in conflict zones, the potential limits of the CSR norm 
in conflict zones are briefly discussed. It should be alluded to, that some guiding 
principles of the CSR norm as well as their corresponding measures are covered by 
national and international regulations. This holds true for human rights and labor 
standards. However, most governments in developing countries do not implement 
ratified human rights and labor treaties.19 In most of the developing world CSR activities 
in the field of environmental protection are characterized by their voluntary nature and 
                                                 
17 But this is hard to verify. Looking at empirical evidence and taking membership in CSR initiatives 
and the publication of sustainability reports as preliminary indicators only a small number of TNCs 
react to the CSR norm (of 60.000 TNCs world wide only about 1000 participate in the Global 
Compact and only 170 take part in the World Business Council for Sustainable Development). 
Applying the criteria of Finnemore/Sikkink to TNCs, one-third of the total population in the system 
have to adopt a norm before the stage of a norm cascade is reached (Finnemore, Sikkink 1998: 901). 
Following this argument it is rather obvious that the CSR norm is still emerging. 
18 However, this paper does not focus on the development of a norm within a ”community of TNCs”, 
but is rather limited to the norm socialization process of a single TNC. In order to avoid confusion it 
is important to note that this paper focuses on TNCs as norm addressees and not as norm 
entrepreneurs.It is assumed that TNCs in the phase of norm emergence rather react to than actively 
promote the CSR norm, this would rather be expected in the phase of a norm cascade. 
19 See comparison of ratification of treaties and information on human rights abuses in Global Civil 
Society Yearbook (2002: 286-295). 
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are therefore essentially beyond legal compliance. The ”triple bottom line” of the CSR 
norm includes that economic, social and environmental impacts have to be integrated into 
business activities, but, businesses are not responsible for solving all social problems. 
They are responsible for solving problems they have caused, and they are responsible for 
helping to solve problems and social issues related to their business operations and 
interests (Wood, Logsdon 2001: 697).  
 
3.3. Insights from the Spiral Model 
 
The spiral model was developed in order to explain why, how and under which 
conditions international human rights norms are internalized by states and individuals 
(Risse, Sikkink 1999: 1). By introducing a five-phase dynamic model of human rights 
change consisting of several boomerang throws, Risse et al. specify mechanisms and 
conditions under which states move through the different phases and finally internalize 
human rights norms (Keck, Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002: 267). In this model the process of 
norm internalization encompasses three different types of socialization processes 
(Idealtypen), which correspond to different logics of action. It can be distinguished 
between the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness (March, Olsen 
1998). In addition, a lengthy debate within the German IR community let to the 
identification of a third logic of action: the logic of arguing (argumentative rationality) 
(Risse 2000). 
Risse et al. assign different logics of action to different phases of the socialization process 
within the spiral model. The logic of consequentialism dominates in the earlier phases of 
the socialization process. It is defined by processes of adaptation and strategic 
bargaining. The logic of arguing can be identified in the onward process and is 
characterized by communication, argumentation and persuasion. The logic of 
appropriateness, which is characterized by processes of internalization and 
habitualization, can be found in the final stages of the norm socialization process (Risse, 
Sikkink 1999: 11). Although, as Risse concluded, the spiral model has been applied 
successfully to the human rights area, there has been, as of yet, no systematic research for 
other issue areas in international politics (Risse 2002: 267). In addition, states have been 
the focus of attention.  
In this paper the spiral model is used as a heuristic device for analyzing the process of 
adoption of the CSR norm by TNCs and the resulting behavioural consequences in 
conflict zones.20 Furthermore, it is analyzed whether private actor’s norm socialization 
process is characterized by the same logic of action.  
 
                                                 
20 We do not claim to reproduce the full complexity of the spiral model, we simply make use of the 
basic ideas for developing new hyptheses on the behavior of TNCs. We allude to the fact that we 
focus only on some aspects of the model while neglecting others. 
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3.4. Norm Socialization of TNCs in Conflict Zones 
 
In the following section, three hypotheses on the socialization process of TNCs will be 
introduced. The analysis is limited to four phases21: denial, tactical concessions, norm 
acceptance and internalization. Moreover, the interaction between TNCs and 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs)22 are emphasized, whereby TANs are 
considered to be norm entrepreneurs. The role of state actors of TNCs in the norm 
socialization process of TNCs is largely neglected, because neither home nor host states 
usually exercise their power to regulate TNCs’ behavior. 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: The Spiral Model and Corporate Conflict Prevention 
 
In the phase of denial a TNC is confronted by a TAN. TNCs are accused of actively 
contributing and even causing conflict and the TAN demands from the TNC that it 
behaves socially responsible. The accusations can take a number of forms, such as 
TNCs’ complicity by financing and supporting a repressive regime, directly or indirectly 
contributing to human rights violations, breeding corruption and supporting the 
indiscriminate use of force by public and private security forces against the civil 
population. Yet, TNCs neither consider themselves as an addressee of the norm nor do 
they regard the norm to be applicable in these instances. This means that they deny any 
responsibility. In this phase a TNC negates or does not comment on the pressure exerted 
by a TAN. TNCs might also deny their responsibility by referring to the division between 
the public and the private sphere, which they consider to be a superior norm. They 
remain relatively passive, conduct business as usual and do not contribute to conflict 
                                                 
21 The original spiral model includes five phases, but in the understanding of the authors the first 
phase ”repression” is not considered part of the actual socialization process.  
We are deeply grateful to Miriam Schröder for this and other suggestions regarding the spiral model 
put forth in her Master Thesis (Schröder 2003). 
22 Transnational advocacy networks include those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, 
who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information 
and services (Keck, Sikkink 1998).  
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prevention. It is assumed, that in this phase TNCs’ behavior is solely based on the logic 
of consequentialism and follows a narrow cost-benefit way of thinking. 
 
The transition to phase two of the norm socialization process is characterized by 
increasing pressure of the TAN for example by starting to use ”naming and shaming” 
techniques. TAN impact depends on the vulnerability of their targets (Risse 2002: 268). 
The vulnerability of a TNC consists of material (direct) and reputational (indirect) costs. 
In the beginning TNCs start fearing consumer boycotts and negative market signals such 
as falling stock prices, which eventually might turn into material losses. In the mid to 
long term the reputation of a TNC might suffer. Owing to the fact that reputation is a 
relational concept, TNCs have a strong interest in keeping good relations with their 
stakeholders, such as employees, potential business partners, market-rating organizations, 
governments, local communities and NGOs (Haufler 2001b: 26-27; Keohane, Nye 2003: 
390; Mercer 1996: 27). By applying a cost benefit analysis TNCs start reflecting on their 
corporate strategy.  
 
The second phase tactical concessions starts with TNCs justifying their behavior for 
instrumental reasons. They engage in public dialogue with their critics trying to take the 
wind out of their sails. TNCs begin to talk more carefully about the problems raised by 
the TAN and for the first time justify their position and behavior. Yet, they do not accept 
any responsibility for these problems. TNCs’ rhetorical justifications allow the TAN to 
react and a dialogue between the two actors evolves. A TNC finds itself in a process of 
self-entrapment, which might eventually pass over into argumentative behavior oriented 
toward reaching a common understanding ("verständigungsorientiertes Handeln", Risse 
2000: 9). A TNC no longer denies the validity of the norm, instead, it gradually 
intensifies the discussion on the role it plays and what norm-consistent behavior may 
look like. For these reasons rhetorical concessions are likely to lead to first concrete 
measures with regard to their role in a conflict (Talk is not cheap!). A TNC might 
increase corporate giving, design stakeholder dialogues, initiate community development 
and install measures to fight corruption or undertake any other measures that contribute 
to the provision of security, well-being and justice. The dominant logic of action can be 
expected to change from a purely rationalist logic of consequentialism to a logic of 
arguing. 
 
 
The transition to the phase of norm acceptance is mainly driven by TNCs’ increasing 
belief in the legitimacy of a norm. Legitimacy is defined as the normative belief by an 
actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed (Hurd 1999: 381). Saying that a rule is 
accepted as legitimate by some actor, says nothing about its justice in the eyes of an 
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outside observer.23  
Moreover, this emerging normative commitment is mirrored by a TNC’s desire to 
become a member of an esteemed global community of state and non-state actors. 
This global community shares and values the CSR norm.24 At the same time the TAN 
as well as domestic opposition groups are strengthened because TNCs accept them as 
”equal” counterparts in discussions. They keep on exerting pressure on the TNC from 
above and below. 
 
In the phase of norm acceptance a TNC accepts the validity of the norm, although this 
does not necessarily mean that a TNC always complies with the norm. On a rhetorical 
level a TNC regularly refers to the norm to describe and comment on its own 
behavior. Moreover, a TNC installs institutional mechanisms within the company that 
are supposed to guide corporate decisions. This may take the form of a Code of 
Conduct, the establishment of CSR or other specialized departments, special 
representatives as well as internal and external complaint mechanisms. 
In their external relations a TNC undertakes sincere measures of conflict prevention. 
Measures introduced in the previous phase are intensified and additional initiatives are 
considered, such as promoting aspects of good governance on a national level. In this 
phase the logic of appropriateness replaces the logic of arguing as the dominant mode 
of interaction.  
The last phase, internalization, constitutes the final stage of the norm socialization 
process and is dominated by the logic of appropriateness. The TNC’s behavior has 
fully converged around the CSR norm. The TNC behaves rule-consistent.  
 
                                                 
23 It is important to note that this is not a relational concept but a property concept that can be defined 
and measured without reference to another actor (Mercer 1996: 27). 
24 This is an attempt to specify the conditions for the transition from the phase of tactical concessions 
to norm acceptance within the spiral model. Unfortunately the key variable in the spiral model 
”regime change” does not seem applicable to private actors (Risse, Sikkink 1999: 28). At the same 
time, the logic of appropriateness, next to the logic of arguing, is expected to step in and to succinctly 
gain ground. Further research should include the specification of these conditions (Risse 2003: 120). 
Even the very useful summary on socialization processes by Schimmelfennig does not provide further 
insights, mainly owing to the fact that he concentrates on the disctinction between the logic of 
consequences and the logic of appropriateness and does not explicitly considers the logic of arguing 
(Schimmelfennig 2003: 412-415). 
 19
Conflict prevention behavior in different phases 
Hypothesis 1: The more a TNC internalizes the CSR norm, the more likely it is a TNC will carry out 
measures of conflict prevention.  
 
Transition processes from one phase to another 
Hypothesis 2: The more a TNC values its reputation and the more powerful the mobilization and 
enforcement power of a TAN, the more likely it is that TNCs will move to the phase tactical concessions.  
Hypothesis 3: The more a TNC believes in the legitimacy of a norm, the more likely it is that under the 
condition of sustained pressure by a TAN a TNC will move to the phase of norm acceptance. 
 
 Box 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
  
These three hypotheses together form a basis on which to examine the norm socialization 
process of a TNC in a conflict zone. The case of Shell in Nigeria constitutes one of the 
most prominent examples for the role and the extent and limits of responsibilities of 
TNCs in conflict zones. 
 
 
4. The Case of Shell 
  
4.1. Case Selection 
 
In the third section of this paper a model of TNCs’ norm socialization was developed, in 
this section the argument is illustrated using an empirical case study. The goal is to probe 
the plausibility of the hypotheses (Eckstein 1975: 108). Due to fact that the hypotheses 
are confronted with empirical data for the first time, a plausibility probe is the most 
appropriate instrument: The advantage is that first empirical results can be obtained 
without following strict methodological requirements of a theory test. Such a plausibility 
probe is certainly not a substitute for a theory test, nevertheless, it is a necessary step in 
theory-building, since it assists in distinguishing ”plausible” from ”less plausible” 
models.  
For this purpose the case of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group (Shell) in Nigeria has been 
chosen. This case seems well suited because of a large variance on the dependent 
variable, namely the behavior of Shell in conflict zones. In addition, Shell is one of the 
most prominent cases of a TNC operating in a conflict zone and it resembles a current 
situation of policy concern (Van Evera 1997: 77-88).  
Companies in the extractive industry have received increasing public and academic 
attention during the last years. They have been criticized for their misconduct in internal 
conflicts, for example in Angola, Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The risk of becoming involved in internal conflicts in these countries is very high for 
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TNCs. This is mainly due to the high revenues generated by these companies, which 
often cause conflicts between competing domestic groups. Moreover the extractive sector 
is of overwhelming importance to the economies in these states. TNCs in the extractive 
industries are characterized by a high asset-specificity, which means that they cannot 
easily change their production facilities, due to the enormous investments, to another 
location. 
 
4.2. The Conflict in Nigeria25 
 
In 1960 Nigeria gained independence from Britain. Senior members of the armed forces 
dominated Nigerian politics from independence until 1999, with only short periods of 
civilian government. These fourty years have been shaped by ethnic-based factional 
tensions, endemic corruption and political ambitions of the military. From 1993 until 
1998 General Sani Abacha ruled the country and established a military dictatorship. After 
his sudden death in 1998 a guided transition to general elections and civilian rule was 
initiated surprisingly by another military leader. In May 1999, a democratically elected 
government, headed by President Obasanjo, was sworn in. Since then, however, the 
central state authority has not been successful in solving the country’s main problem in 
accommodating ethnic and religious tensions between various regions. Political and 
communal violence has further escalated over time and over 10.000 individuals have 
been killed in communal violence since 1999. Nigeria’s nascent democracy continues to 
be plagued by ethnic friction, regional contention, economic scarcity and religious 
polarization. Three regionally divisive and politically explosive issues threaten the new 
democratic order: First, the institutionalization of the sharia (Islamic law) in the 
predominantly Muslim north, second, the agitation for true federalism in southern 
Nigeria generally, and third, the fight over oil profits between the central government and 
the southern residents of the Niger Delta.  
Nigeria is Africa's leading oil producer and ranks among the top 10 oil producing 
countries in the world. Oil is the country's main natural resource and accounts for 80% of 
its revenue and 95% of its export earnings. 90% of the country’s crude oil is produced in 
the Niger Delta. Despite this oil wealth, this region is desperately poor and 
underdeveloped. Most workers survive on 300 US $ per year and according to a report 
by the World Bank around 66% of the population now fall below the poverty line of 1 
US $ a day compared to 43% in 1985.26 Conflicts over the distribution of oil revenues 
have afflicted Nigeria since its independence in 1960. In practice, much of the funds 
either fail to reach the producing areas or are distributed through patronage to extract 
                                                 
25 This concise overview of Nigerias history and development since 1960 is mainly based on the 
Polity IV Country Report (2002). 
26 In 2003 Nigeria was ranked 152 among 175 graded countries, falling from rank 148 in 2002 
(UNDP Human Development Report 2003). 
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political benefits. Widespread corruption has further diluted the development potential of 
oil revenues (Frankental, House 2000: 94; Transparency International 2003: 265). In 
addition, the local environment has been devastated by drilling and production activities 
of various companies. These companies include almost all of the largest TNCs in the oil 
sector, such as BP, Chevron-Texaco, Exxon-Mobile, Royal Dutch/ Shell, Statoil and 
TotalFina-Elf. 
 
4.3. Royal Dutch/ Shell – Company Profile 
 
In 1907 Royal Dutch and Shell merged all their operations. Despite merging their 
interests, the companies remain separate. Today, the Royal Dutch/ Shell Group of 
Companies (Shell) is one of the largest transnational oil companies. It operates in 145 
countries and employs more than 115.000 persons worldwide. Crude oil production is 
Shell’s main source of income, constituting more than 75% of its revenues. In Nigeria, 
Shell is active through the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), which is 
part of a joint venture, consisting of Shell, the Nigeria National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC), Elf and Agip.27 This joint venture is operated by the Nigerian branch of Shell, 
which means that Shell manages the entire project on behalf of the other shareholders. It 
is responsible for half of the production of Nigerian crude oil. Shell’s presence in Nigeria 
dates back to 1937, when the first exploration license in Nigeria was granted to Shell. Oil 
production in the Niger Delta started in 1958. Today, Shell employs more than 10.000 
people in Nigeria, 95% of whom are Nigerian. 
 
4.4. Shell in Nigeria – Presentation of Different Phases of Engagement  
 
In the next section different phases of Shell’s engagement in Nigeria are described, 
focussing on two areas of action: building human capital and the promotion of human 
rights. These two areas of action illustrate a TNC’s changing behavior in a conflict zone 
and the corresponding triggers.28  
 
First Phase until 1995:  Business as usual 
Until the early 1990s the conflict situation in Nigeria received little international 
attention. Shell conducted ”business as usual” and did not pay much attention to the 
conflict on the distribution of oil revenues between the government and ethnic groups in 
                                                 
27 SPDC is the operator of a joint venture involving the Nigerian National National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) which holds 55 per cent, Shell (30 per cent), Totalfina-Elf (10 percent) and Agip 
(5 per cent) (Shell 2002 Annual Report: 52). 
28 Knowing that unbiased and independent data on TNCs’ behavior is hard to obtain, different sources 
of information were consulted and balanced. These include corporate publications, civil society 
reports and governmental sources.  
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the oil-producing region. At the beginning of the 1990s unrest unfolded, mainly driven 
by ethnic groups.  
One of the first major demonstrations against Shell was that of the Etche people at 
Umuechem village, Rivers State in October 1990. It was the first incident that brought 
the situation in the Niger Delta to international attention, and remains one of the most 
serious loss of life directly involving oil company activities. During protests that took 
place at Shell’s facility at Umuechem, 80 unarmed protesters were killed and hundreds 
of houses were burned by the Nigerian Mobile Police (Human Rights Watch 1999). 
The concerns of the protesters were oil production and related environmental damages 
and the lack of distribution of economic benefits to the local people (Frankental, House 
2000: 94). 29 
In 1990, another ethnic group, the Ogoni people organized themselves in the Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). MOSOP campaigned for a greater share 
of oil revenues, political autonomy and ownership of the oil in their land. The Ogoni 
staged their first mass demonstrations in 1993. It demanded US $6 billion in rent and 
royalities from Shell and US $4 billion for environmental degradation. As a result of this 
campaign Shell withdrew and seized production from its flow stations in Ogoni, but 
continued its operations in the rest of the Niger Delta. Yet, pipelines carrying oil from 
other Shell oil fields continued to cross the area. 
MOSOP with the strong support of the Ogoni people sustained its protests. Shell was 
criticized for calling government troops for help in response to these demonstrations. As 
a consequence the security forces retaliated and attacked Ogoni villages and people. In 
addition, Shell was accused of supporting the operations of the Nigerian security forces 
by providing logistics and contributing to the wages for the security forces (Human 
Rights Watch 1999: Chapter X). Phillip Watts, Managing Director of SPDC, stated in a 
letter to the Inspector General of Police, that 
 ”we also reiterate our appreciation for excellent cooperation we have received from the Nigerian 
Police Force in helping to preserve the security of our operations.” (Project Underground 1997b: 8) 
The tensions continued to grow following the same pattern. Demonstrations led by ethnic 
groups were followed by repression and culminated in May 1994, when the charismatic 
leader of the Ogoni people, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was arrested. In May 1994, Ken Saro-
Wiwa, one of the main critics of Shell, and several other Ogonis were arrested for 
supposedly killing other fellow Ogoni leaders and sentenced to death in a mock trial in 
                                                 
29 There are various accounts to what has exactly happened during these protests. Shell stressed that 
the 80 unarmed protesters were killed and hundreds of houses were burned by the Nigerian Mobile 
Police in reaction to the killing of one of their colleagues. According to the company, the policeman 
was one of a team dispatched earlier to stop the occupation of a Shell rig location and nearby 
flowstation by armed youth from Umuechem community.  
In contrast, civil society organizations accused Shell for requesting security protection for its facilities 
from Nigerian authorities, with a preference for the paramilitary Mobile Police (Human Rights Watch 
1999). 
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June 1994.   
Although pressure on Shell from international civil society organizations and domestic 
groups increased, the company declined to act on behalf of Saro-Wiwa and the others, 
stating that:  
 ”There are now demands that Shell should intervene, and use its perceived ‘influence’ to have the 
judgement overturned. This would be dangerous and wrong. … A commercial organisation like 
Shell cannot and must not interfere with the legal processes of any sovereign state.” (Shell 1995a; b) 
Shortly before the execution was scheduled, Shell for the first time responded to public 
demands: Cor Herkströter, President of Royal Dutch, wrote a personal letter to General 
Abacha and appealed for clemency of the death sentence of Ken Saro-Wiwa on 
humanitarian grounds. At the same time Shell explicitly denied that this intervention was 
a comment on the proceedings of the tribunal, restating that as a multinational company 
to interfere in such processes, whether political or legal, in any country would be wrong. 
This intervention did not change the course of events. The eight Ogoni leaders, including 
Saro-Wiwa, were finally hanged on November 10, 1995. Following the execution many 
NGOs started to call for a boycott of Shell to hold it accountable.30 Human Rights Watch 
contacted Shell regarding its role in Nigeria urging the company to take constructive 
steps to end human rights violations in connection with its operations. In a first 
substantive response Shell wrote:  
 ”You have called for Shell to become involved in, and to take a public stance on, several issues … 
all of which are political. They are clearly issues where we as a commercial organisation have 
neither the right nor the competence to become involved and they must be addressed by the people 
of Nigeria and their government.” (Human Rights Watch 1999: 2-3) 
Moreover, Shell repeatedly referred to its own contribution in improving the 
communities’ quality of life in the Niger Delta. In 1995 Shell spend a total US$ 25 
million on community development projects (Shell 1995a).31 
 
In this first phase Shell was confronted with increasing criticism by a transnational 
activist network. Shell did not accept any responsibility for the events in the Niger Delta. 
Instead, Shell repeatedly referred to the issues at stake as being public ones. At this stage, 
human rights considerations were not included in Shell’s business operations. Some 
efforts were made to develop human capital (community development projects), yet these 
programs were heavily criticized for not meeting communities’ basic needs. 
 
Second Phase 1995-1998: Shell moves 
                                                 
30 In 1995 Shell was also under pressure by a campaign lead by Greenpeace. Activists occupied the 
Brent Spar oil platform which had come to the end of its working life and was due to be dumped at 
sea.  
31 As a comparison Germany made payments of official development assistance (ODA) of 40 Mio. 
Euro in 2002.  
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In 1996 Shell started the world-wide dialogue programme ”Societies changing 
expectations” to better understand society’s changing expectations of multinationals and 
to explore the reputation, image and overall standing of the company. In addition, Shell 
started a dialogue with major NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Pax Christi 
(Tangen 2003: 8).  
On the ground Shell intensified community programmes. In May 1997 SPDC announced 
the launch of a ten-month Ogoni youth training scheme, which would train 366 youths in 
a variety of skills like carpentry and computer studies. As another example Shell took 
over the running of the Gokana hospital in Ogoni land. These new and intensified 
programmes were immediately criticized by MOSOP leaders and unrest continued.  
In addition, the restructuring of local councils that year caused ethnic violence in 
particular in Warri. Changes in the local government structure had strong effects on the 
distribution of wealth from the oil revenues between different ethnic groups (CIDCM 
1999). Furthermore, oil spills and pipeline explosions continued to ravage communities 
and the environment in Nigeria.32 
International civil society organisations stepped up their naming and shaming strategies 
by calling the victims of supposed Shell activities ”Shell Refugees” or ”Shell Prisoners” 
(Project Underground 1996). For example civil society organisations revealed that Shell 
had been in negotiations for the import of arms for use by the Nigerian police (Human 
Rights Watch 1999: 9). Further a lawsuit by the families of the executed Ogoni leaders 
has been filed against Shell in New York under the Alien Tort Claims Act for complicity 
in the execution of Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders. And in 
1997 a special rapporteur was appointed by the Commission on Human Rights to submit 
a report on the human rights situation of Nigeria. The report, submitted in February 1998, 
criticized the Nigerian governments failure to address the plight of the Ogoni people and 
additionally called for an investigation into the activities of the multinational oil giant 
Shell (United Nations 1998).33 
Owing to this sustained pressure and during the one year global consultation process 
Shell published its reviewed version of the group’s Statement of General Business 
Principles in 1997 (Human Rights Watch 1999: 13).  
 
Shell explicitly committed itself to  
                                                 
32 Oil spills can either be caused by sabotage or by technical failure. Shell pointed out that oil spills are 
well documented and investigated. The company emphasized the fact that the results of investigations 
(usually done by a combined team comprising regulators, the operator and the community) are available 
from the regulators (government offices) in the States. 
However, NGOs often question the results of these investigations, because the decision whether a oil 
spill occurred because of sabotage or technical failure is also related to the issue of compensation for 
local communities. If a oil spill occurs due to sabotage, there is no compensation for local 
communities (see for example Human Rights Watch 1999). 
33 Shell emphasized that it was not invited to participate in any investigations.  
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 ”respect the human rights of their employees … express support for fundamental human rights in 
line with the legitimate role of business.” (Shell 1997) 
For many NGOs this represented a public relations strategy, but for others this move 
constituted a positive step, because from then on Shell added these principles to each new 
joint venture agreement (Schwartz, Gibb 1999: 32). This was the first time that the Shell 
Group had included a general commitment to human rights principles or sustainable 
development in such a document (Human Rights Watch 1999: 13). In addition, Shell 
formed a new twelve-member Social Accountability Committee and assigned a senior 
director to be responsible for CSR issues. 
On the local level Shell’s behavior remained still ambivalent. In January 1997 Shell 
stated that it would not return to Ogoni Land without an ”invitation” of the local 
community. However, numerous reports indicate that Shell has been bribing local 
officials to sign such statements of invitation (Project Underground 1997a: 1). 
In June 1997 Shell opened negotiations with MOSOP representatives and in mid 1997 
Shell believed that a process of reconciliation was underway and that there would be a 
breakthrough before the end of the year. 
 
To sum up, after 1995 self-criticism became a common feature in Shell statements and 
reports. Shell admitted that it had not fully comprehended the consequences of its actions 
(Tangen 2003: 7). Shell explicitly and actively put human rights on the agenda by 
including human rights aspects into the revised Statement of General Business Principles. 
On the ground Shell made first steps and launched new community development 
programs.  
 
Third Phase since 1998: Signs of Acceptance 
Since 1998 Shell has consistently referred to itself as a responsible corporate citizen. It 
has also published several reports, many of them focusing on their involvement in 
Nigeria. In 1998, Shell published its first sustainability report, named ”Profits and 
Principles – Does There Have To Be A Choice?”, a document of landmark character 
dealing with the question of how to integrate aspects of social responsibility into 
business. The report states:  
 ”This report is about values … We care about what you think … We want to ensure that our 
businesses are run in a way that is ethically acceptable to the rest of the world and in line with our 
own values. Without principles no company deserves profit ... There does not have to be a choice 
between profits and principles.” (Shell 1998b: 3) 
This report marked an astonishing reversal to many observers, since at the 1997 annual 
shareholder meeting, retiring chairman John Jennings had stated that the board could not 
accept activist demands for such a report (Schwartz, Gibb 1999: 28-29). 
In the following years Shell introduced different management primers, dealing for 
example with human rights, child labor and bribery and corruption, explaining to its 
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employees how to tackle such delicate issues. Moreover, Shell introduced an annual 
”Business Principle Letter”, that has to be signed by every country chairman, thereby 
confirming that the Business Principles are understood and implemented. 
 
Regarding its activities on the global level, Shell became a member of new initiatives, 
such as the UN Global Compact, and became more involved in human rights and other 
related social issues in networks such as the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development or the European Roundtable of Industrialists. 
In 1998 Shell also left the Global Climate Coalition, a coalition which heavily lobbied 
governments to turn public opinion against concrete action on greenhouse gas emissions. 
Instead, on the local level SPDC has started ISO certification of its facilities (ISO 14001 
Standards for Environmental Management Systems) which entails mandatory 
surveillance and re-certification every three years (Shell 2003c; d). Regarding the major 
environmental problem of oil spills Shell changed its position and today publicly reports 
on the number of incidents, the volume of oil spilled and which measures where taken 
(Shell 2001; 2002).  
 
On the local level community protests persist because of a perceived continuing gap 
between Shell’s rhetoric and the reality in Nigeria. Positive changes in Shell’s stance 
were exemplified, when in January 1998 following the arrest of the Ogoni leaders Batom 
Mittee, Shell appealed for the highest standard of human rights to be upheld (Frankental, 
House 2000: 96). Mittee was subsequently released and the Military Police withdrew 
from Ogoni. Shell also actively lobbied for a better treatment for the Delta Region 
including an increase of the oil revenues that are given to the oil producing regions. The 
figure raised from 3% to 13% in 2002 (Litvin 2003b: 267). Regarding the sensible issue 
of security forces Shell adopted in 1998 Use of Force Guidelines. In relation to these 
guidelines SPDC declared that ”under no circumstances must SPDC engage or call to be 
engaged any military or paramilitary forces” (cited in Frankental, House 2000: 95). Shell 
also intensified its community activities by increasing its spending and by extending the 
involvement of local communities in developing these projects.34 These projects include 
extensive education programmes, including scholarships and peace education 
programme training women and youth in leadership and peace making, stakeholder 
workshops etc. Moreover these community development projects are today monitored by 
KPMG and supplemented by an external stakeholder monitoring (Shell 2003b; 2002).  
 
Nevertheless Shell has not always complied with its own proclaimed standards. The 
relationship between local communities and Shell is still characterized by mistrust and 
misunderstanding. Ogoni people still fear that Shell will resume oil production on their 
                                                 
34 Shell increased its spending from about $4 million a year in the late 1980s to $25 million in 1995 
and finally to $50 million in 2003 (Litvin 2003b; Project Underground 1997b). 
 27
land and they still fight for a fair share and adequate compensation for environmental 
damages. This holds true for all other ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. For example 
when in April 2000 the Ogoni people began peaceful protests in reaction to the 
construction of a new road by one of Shell’s contractors, police and military forces 
immediately swept into Ogoni Land (Project Underground 2000b). Oil spills caused by 
Shell’s oil production continue to ravage communities and the environment. 
Responsibility for these spills is still not always accepted by Shell, for example in 
Gokana fires caused by ruptured pipelines, had been burning for two months without 
reaction from authorities or Shell. In addition, when in June 2000 a Nigerian court 
ordered the oil giant Shell to pay 40 Mio US $ in compensation for an oil spill, that had 
happened 30 years ago, Shell filed an additional motion further delaying the communities 
long awaited redress for damages by the spill (Project Underground 2000a). 
In a speech before the 2003 Commonwealth Business Forum in Abuja, Nigeria, Shell 
managing director Chris Finlayson analyzed Shell’s involvement in Nigeria:  
 ”At that time [mid 90’s, authors’ note], we were facing strong external challenges – not least about 
our operations in Nigeria. We began by trying to understand how people’s expectations of business 
around the world were changing – and this included engaging with critics about their concerns. As a 
result, we added two new commitments to our business principles – to support fundamental human 
rights and to contribute to Sustainable Development. We also put sustained effort into embedding 
these principles in our organization and processes. And we began a comprehensive assurance 
process to monitor compliance throughout our operations in the 145 countries where Shell is 
present.” (Shell 2003c) 
  
To summarize, it can be inferred from this statement and the arguments presented that 
Shell has accepted some responsibility for the impact of its operations and paid more 
attention to stakeholder expectations. As an outcome it gradually changed its behavior 
since 1998. Human rights commitments were detailed in several documents and Shell 
introduced institutional mechanisms to support compliance with the CSR norm. In the 
Niger Delta community development programs were further intensified and improved, 
including a stakeholder monitoring process. In some instances Shell publicly spoke out in 
favor of human rights.   
 
Underlying the gradual change in Shell’s behavior two causes have been identified that 
have triggered Shell’s new understanding of the business environment and its societal 
impact: Reputational concerns and the legitimacy of the CSR norm. 
First, for a variety of reasons the structural characteristics of Shell have made it 
vulnerable to societal protests. The vulnerability is dependent on its relationship with 
stakeholders and this relationship in turn hinges on how much confidence and reputation 
a company enjoys with them. Starting with Shell’s host countries, due to the fact that 
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most of Shell’s upstream activities take place in developing countries with weak 
governments, human rights violations are not uncommon, corruption and civil violence 
are widespread. Shell has been particularly vulnerable to community anger and 
disturbances in on-shore oil production because of the physical location and spread of its 
facilities in large areas (Litvin 2003b: 259; New York Times 2004; Shell 2003a; Tangen 
2003: 3). Owing to community unrest Shell until today could not return to Ogoni land 
and resume its oil drilling operations and supposedly loses money on a daily basis (Daily 
Champion 2004). Home states instead might start investigations based on TNC’s 
violations of international agreements, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.35 
Moreover, gas stations can be seen as Shell’s Achilles’ heel in their home states and in 
large parts of OECD states: Shell has a large share of gas stations in markets where 
consumer boycotts have been commonly practised, e.g. Germany and the UK (Tangen 
2003: 5). This might have direct effects on profits. Moreover, the stock market might see 
future earnings at risk, if a company has to cut proven reserves and, in addition, has 
trouble to continue oil drilling in some designated oil fields.36 
For these reasons, Shell is very susceptible to TAN pressure. This pressure has the 
potential to cause reputational costs. In the second phase Shell started realizing that a 
relationship with the people of Nigeria is rewarding. Shell admits on its homepage that 
stakeholder workshops have improved relations with people of the Niger Delta and 
brought about a much greater understanding of local problems (Shell 1998a).   
 
Second, Shell have communicated in different ways that they believe in the CSR norm 
and that the norm has become more important to the company. Accompanied by 
persistent TAN pressure Shell has started to reflect on its corporate strategy. Today, Shell 
openly admits that in the past it has focused mainly on the physical impact of any given 
project on its immediate location, but this has changed so that the three ‘pillars’ of 
sustainable development are taken into account equally (Shell 2004). It is hard, if not 
impossible, to find out whether this is pure rhetoric or whether there is a true 
commitment by Shell. At least Shell has opened up itself in Nigeria to stakeholder 
dialogues and has even cooperated with the World Bank’s Business Partners for 
Development project on examining ‘Tri-Sector Partnerships for Managing Social Issues 
in the Extractive Industries’ which comes close to some form of external monitoring. 
Within a stakeholder dialogue in 2002 Shell even reacted to claims about dialogue and 
peaceful resolution of conflicts by stating that they plan to empower the community 
development staff in the use of dialogue and peace building techniques (Shell 2003e). A 
                                                 
35 This has happened already in at least two cases in the extractive industry, both of which have 
remained anonymous in the OECD procedure.  
36 As a consequnece of a reassessment of its ioil fields in Nigeria that led Shell to cut proven reserves 
by 20% last month, the stock prices plummeted by 8% on one day and six weeks later the CEO of 
Shell, Philipp Watts, stepped down (Financial Times Germany 04.03.2004; Financial Times Germany 
12.01.2004).  
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Shell representative admitted that one of the goals of taking part in this World Bank 
project was to bring about a social license to operate (World Bank 2002: 1). On the 
international level Shell has made various attempts to demonstrate that they are willing to 
follow the CSR norm and that they want to be part of an esteemed global community by 
participating in a number of initiatives such as in the World Bank’s Business Partners for 
Development Programme, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the 
UN Global Compact, the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum and the US-UK 
Voluntary Principles (Nelson 2000: 25).  
Summing up, reputational concerns and the belief in the legitimacy of the CSR norm are 
triggers for changing Shell behavior towards adopting more conflict prevention 
measures.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The conjecture that norms other than habitual cost-benefit calculations have an impact on 
TNCs’ behavior in conflict zones does not intuitively come to mind. However, the 
presented case study provides a comprehensive account of how Shell has started 
changing its way of thinking about business and also how it has modified its behavior 
concerning social issues in zones of conflict. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the spiral model can be successfully taken as a platform for 
developing a model of norm socialization by private actors. The results of the study 
confirm the introduced hypotheses, because the suggested relationship between the 
increasing importance of the norm and the corresponding behavior of the TNC could be 
established. 
When the conflict in Nigeria erupted in the early 1990s Shell did not leave but stayed in 
Nigeria, despite being steadily attacked by a TAN. After all, it did not ignore the raised 
complaints but instead gradually adjusted its behavior and for the past years has been in 
the midst of transforming its way of thinking, beginning to internalize the ”triple bottom 
line” and ”walk the talk”, as it has become the jargon within the so-called CSR 
community.  
 
A TNC that decides to stay in a zone of conflict has several behavioral options. In the 
Shell case study measures in both analyzed areas of action could be observed. Both areas, 
such as building human capital and promoting human rights standards are important 
contributions to a transition to a more peaceful society. Moreover, it has been found out 
that the two examined areas of action are intertwined and isolated efforts in one area have 
only limited potential to improve the situation in a conflict zone.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that for several reasons TNCs will never resolve a 
conflict alone. First, despite the fact that Shell has invested large sums in community 
development, the task of building infrastructure, livelihood opportunities and building 
local institutions, the resolution of conflict and the sustainable improvement of conditions 
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on the ground is beyond the capability of a single company (World Bank 2002: 8). 
Second, in the case of Nigeria a comprehensive solution to the conflict hinges on the 
willingness of the government and the various ethnic groups.37 Third, the participation of 
all companies in the oil sector would be necessary. This would eventually also lead to the 
much contested ”level playing field” for all companies. However, the readiness to pool 
resources is limited. In addition, in Nigeria Shell was confronted with criticism that it has 
broken ranks with some of the other oil companies by being proactive in the human 
rights arena (Frankental, House 2000: 96).  
Shell’s behavior, its market position and its self-image were succinctly influenced by the 
emerging CSR norm. This norm requires TNCs to behave ethically responsible and to 
integrate social and environmental aspects into its core business activities. The 
internalization of the norm is complicated by its lack of specificity (Legro 1997: 34). A 
common ground on some core ingredients has been established, but further parts and 
guidelines are contested. 
 
It has been analyzed that the transition processes are shaped by two triggers. In the early 
stages Shell’s reaction was based on a cost-benefit analysis. Tactical concessions led to a 
process of self-entrapment and an ongoing dialogue with NGOs has evolved. In order to 
remain credible Shell had ”to put its money where its mouth is”. In the further 
development of the socialization process this purely rationalist logic was supplemented 
by a logic of appropriateness. Shell has begun to accept the CSR norm and engages in a 
number of initiatives on the local, national and global level. 
The results suggest that both material interests and global norms, supported by ongoing 
TAN pressure can influence TNCs’ behavior. Each of these factors has a stronger 
emphasis in a different phase. In fact both, the logic of consequence and the logic of 
appropriateness are necessary in order to coherently explain the gradual change of TNCs’ 
behavior in conflict zones (see Snidal 2002: 80). In the beginning the fear of bad 
consequences trumps any developments of possible norm adoption or even 
internalization, but through ongoing interactions between the company and its  
stakeholders the logic of appropriateness may take over.38 Fearon and Wendt speak of a 
developmental division between different ways of norm enforcement (Fearon, Wendt 
2002: 62). 
 
Transferring these results to other cases, as presented in the introduction, an application 
of the developed hypotheses seems promising. Unocal, an American company operating 
in Burma, is confronted by a TAN but has tried to reduce its vulnerability by selling its 
                                                 
37 Shell stressed that TNCs operating in conflict zones are in serious dilemma brought about by a range of 
issues: law and order, security/ absence of security, poverty and other social problems. Moreover he asked the 
very valid question, whether this dilemma is appreciated and acknowledged by the developed world.  
38 In this context Shell made a very important point, that it might be possible, that international standards/ norms 
and the needs or demands of local communities are at variance. In this case it is very difficult for TNCs to 
achieve a balance.  
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downstream activities (gas stations). Only recently Unocal made first steps and started to 
defend its behavior in Burma. Taking BP Amoco in Colombia as another example, BP 
seems to be proactive in CSR issues. Compared to other cases, TAN pressure is rather 
moderate, but reputational concerns and CSR leadership seem to be particularly 
important to BP.  
A preliminary look into the relevant literature indicates that many European companies 
take a more proactive and comprehensive approach towards CSR issues than American 
companies. Research on the influence of a home state on TNCs’ behavior and state-TNC 
relationship might explain more variance in a company’s approach than intuitively 
expected (Kollman, Prakash 2001; Pauly, Reich 1997). 
 
Yet, the question remains whether there will be a point of no return. A point of no return 
would be reached when a company considers it a matter of course that it is important and 
necessary to reflect on its corporate social responsibility in conflict zones, no matter how 
intense the external pressure by NGOs or other stakeholders. Even if internalized, to a 
large degree the so-called soft issues such as human rights and environmental protection 
need constant pressure or support by social and/ or legal institutions. Applied to 
companies, this implies that either a national or international legal system imposes 
enough litigation risk, or, if this is not possible, that CSOs and stakeholder groups exert 
constant pressure. This is due to the fact that the norm socialization process is at such an 
early stage that many employees would hardly notice the closure or downsizing of CSR 
departments, which are still not well-positioned or not even established in most 
companies. 
In addition to political risk from above or below, the market itself may exert enough 
pressure on a single company so that no company can evade a CSR movement that is 
gaining ground. At some point processes of emulation or isomorphism may step in, but 
even here the same battle between vulnerability and legitimacy takes place, following 
either the logic of the population ecology approach, that stresses the influence of 
competition, or sociological institutionalism, that emphasizes normative pressure and 
mimetic processes (DiMaggio, Powell 1983; Hannan, Freemann 1977; Hannan, 
Freemann 1984).  
 
This theoretically informed case study has shown that a TNC in the extractive industry 
has started reflecting on its behavior and has made some headway. But is has also been 
demonstrated that without constant pressure by civil society organizations the CSR norm 
has only limited success. Critics may argue that only state regulation will be effective in 
the end, however it has to be kept in mind that public tasks will be never be carried out in 
its entirety by private actors. State regulation can at most advance the ”do no harm” 
approach and not oblige private actors to engage in societal activities. 
 
 
 32
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33
References 
 
Behrent, Michael and Josef Wieland 2003: Corporate Citizenship und strategische 
Unternehmenskommunikation in der Praxis, München: Rainer Hampp Verlag. 
 
Bennett, Juliette 2002: The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict – 2. Conflict Prevention and 
Revenue-Sharing Regimes, New York: United Nations Global Compact Office. 
 
Berman, Jonathan 2000: Boardrooms and Bombs. Strategies of Multinational Corporations in Conflict 
Areas, in: Harvard International Review (Fall 2000), 28-32. 
 
Berman, Jonathan and Tobias Webb 2003: Race To The Top. Attracting And Enabling Global 
Sustainable Business. Business Survey Report, Washington, DC: World Bank, International Finance 
Corporation. 
 
Boekle, Henning, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner 2001: Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory, 
in: Rittberger, Volker (ed.): German Foreign Policy since Unification. Theories and Case Studies, 
Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 105-137. 
 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 1992: An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomay, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping. Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992. 
 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 1997: Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report 
with Executive Summary, Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission. 
 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management 2002: Minorities at Risk. The 
Yoruba Chronology, University of Maryland ([http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/ 
data/ngeayoruchro.htm] Accessed 2004-01-12). 
 
Champain, Phil 2002: Assessing the Corporate Sector in Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention, in:  
Goor, Luc van de and Martina Huber (eds.): Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention. Concept and 
Practice. CPN Yearbook 2000/01, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 145-162. 
 
Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes 1994: Regime Architecture. Elements and Principles, in: 
Nolan, Janne E. (ed.): Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Washington 
DC: Harvard University Press, 65-130. 
 
Daily Champion 2004: Shell Rules Out Early Return to Ogoniland, February 23, 2004 
([http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200402230902.html] Accessed 2004-02-23).  
 
Diamond, Louise and John W. McDonald 1996: Multi-track Diplomacy. A Systems Approach to Peace, 
West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul and Walter W. Powell 1983: The Iron Cage Revisited. Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in: American Sociological Review 48(2), 147-160. 
 
Eckstein, Harry 1975: Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in: Greenstein, Fred I. and Nelson 
W. Polsby (eds.): Handbook of Political Science, Reading: Addison-Wesley, VII: 79-138. 
 
Encarnacion, Teresa, Clem McCartney and Cristina Rosas 1990: The Impact of Concerned Parties on the 
Resolution of Disputes, in: Lindgren, Göran, Peter Wallensteen and Kjell Nordquist (eds.): Issues in Third 
World Conflict Resolution, Uppsala: Uppsala University, 42-96.  
 
 34
European Commission 2001: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Brussels: Office for Official Publ. of the European Communities. 
 
European Commission 2002: Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social 
Responsibility. A business contribution to Sustainable Development, Brussels: Office for Official 
Publ. of the European Communities. 
 
Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt 2002: Rationalism v. Constructivism. A Skeptical View, in: 
Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.):  Handbook of International Relations, 
London: Sage, 52-72. 
 
Financial Times Germany 2004: Shell-Chef tritt nach Bilanzdebakel ab. Wertberichtigung der Öl- und 
Gasreserve werden Philipp Watts zum Verhängnis, March 3, 2004. 
 
Financial Times Germany 2004: Investoren verärgert über Shells Abwertung. Förderbare Öl- und 
Ergasreserven des Energiekonzern um 20% Prozent geringer als bisher angenommen. Aktienkurs 
bricht ein, January 12, 2004. 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink 1998: International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, in: 
International Organization 52(4), 887-917. 
 
Frankental, Peter and Frances House 2000: Human Rights. Is it any of your Business?,  London: 
Amnesty International, The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum. 
 
Friedman, Milton 1970: The Social Responsibility of Business, The New York Times Magazine, 
September 13, 1970, 122-126. 
 
Gagnon, Georgette, Audrey Macklin and Penelope Simons 2003: Deconstructing Engagement. 
Corporate Self-Regulation in Conflict Zones. Implications for Human Rights and Canadian Public 
Policy, Relationships in Transition, Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Law 
Commission of Canada. 
 
Gardner, Anne-Marie 2002: Diagnosing Conflict. What Do We Know?, in: Hampson, Fen Osler and 
David Malone (eds.): From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System, 
Boulder, Colo.; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 15-40. 
 
Gerson, Allan and Nat J. Colletta 2002: Privatizing Peace. From Conflict to Security, Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers. 
 
Gordon, Kathryn 2001: The OECD Guidelines and other Corporate Responsibility Instruments. A 
Comparison, Paris: OECD. 
Habisch, André 2003: Corporate Citizenship. Gesellschaftliches Engagement von Unternehmen in 
Deutschland, Berlin: Springer. 
 
Hamburg, David A. and Jane E. Holl 1999: Preventing Deadly Conflict. From Global Housekeeping 
to Neighbourhood Watch, in: Kaul, Inge, Isabelle Grunberg and Mark A. Stern (eds.): Global Public 
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 366-381. 
 
Hannan, Michael T. and John Freemann 1977: The Population Ecology of Organizations, in: American 
Journal of Sociology 82(5), 929-964. 
 
Hannan, Michael T. and John Freemann 1984: Structural Inertia and Organizational Change, in: American 
Sociological Review 49(2), 149-164. 
 35
 
Harker, John 2000: Human Security in Sudan. The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission. 
Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade. 
 
Haufler, Virginia 1999: Self-Regulation and Business Norms. Political Risk, Political Activism, in: 
Cutler A. Claire, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (eds.): Private Authority and International Affairs, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 199-222. 
 
Haufler, Virginia 2001: Is there a Role for Business in Conflict Management?, in: Crocker, Chester A., 
Fen Osler Hampson and Aall, Pamela A. (eds.): Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing 
International Conflict, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 659-675. 
 
Haufler, Virginia 2001b: A Public Role for the Private Sector. Industry Self-Regulation in a Global 
Economy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Haufler, Virginia 2002: The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of Conflict – 1. Case Studies of 
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships, New York: United Nations Global Compact Office. 
 
Haufler, Virginia 2003: Globalization and Industry Self-Regulation, in: Kahler, Miles and David A. 
Lake (eds.): Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 225-252. 
 
Herrmann, Richard K. 2002: Linking Theory to Evidence in International Relations, in: Carlsnaes, 
Walter,  Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.):  Handbook of International Relations, London: 
Sage, 119-130. 
 
Human Rights Watch 1999: The Price of Oil. Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations 
in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities ([http://hrw.org] Accessed 2003-12-20). 
 
Hurd, Ian 1999: Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, in: International Organization 53(2), 
379-408. 
 
Kahler, Miles and David A. Lake (eds.) 2003: Governance in a Global Economy. Political Authority in 
Transition, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kaul, Inge, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern 1999: Defining Global Public Goods, in: Kaul, Inge, 
Isabelle Grunberg and Mark A. Stern (eds.): Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 
21st Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 2-19. 
 
Kaul, Inge and Ronald U. Mendoza 2003: Advancing the Concept of Public Goods, in: Kaul, Inge, 
Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza (eds.): Providing Global Public Goods. 
Managing Globalization, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 78-111. 
 
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink 1998: Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye 2003: Redefining Accountability for Global Governance, in: 
Kahler, Miles and David A. Lake (eds.): Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in 
Transition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 386-411. 
 
Kollman, Kelly and Aseem Prakash 2001: Green by Choice? Cross-National Variations in Firms' 
Responses to EMS-Based Environmental Regimes, in: World Politics 53(3), 399-430. 
 36
 
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal 2001: The Rational Design of International 
Institutions, in: International Organization 55(4), 761-800. 
 
Legro, Jeffrey W. 1997: Which Norms matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism, in: 
International Organization 51(1), 31-63. 
 
Litvin, Daniel 2003a: Memo to the President. Urgent: A Strategy for Business and Human Rights, in: 
Foreign Policy November/ December 2003, 68-72. 
 
Litvin, Daniel B. 2003b: Empires of Profit: Commerce, Conquest and Corporate Responsibility, New 
York; London: Texere. 
 
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen 1989: Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics, New York: Free Press. 
 
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen 1998: The International Dynamics of International Political Orders, 
in: International Organization 52(4), 943-969. 
 
Matthies, Volker 2000: Krisenprävention: Vorbeugen ist besser als Heilen, Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
 
Mercer, Jonathan 1996: Reputation and International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Muchlinski, Peter 2003: The Development of Human Rights Responsibilities for Multinational 
Enterprises, in: Sullivan, Rory (eds.): Business and Human Rights - Dilemmas and Solutions, 
Sheffield: Greenleaf, 33-51. 
 
Nelson, Jane 2000: The Business of Peace. The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution, London: International Alert, Council on Economic Priorities, The Prince of Wales 
Business Leaders Forum. 
 
New York Times 2004: Shell Withheld Reserves Data To Aid Nigeria, March 19, 2004. 
Pauly, Louis W. and Simon Reich 1997: National Structures and Multinational Corporate Behavior. 
Enduring Differences in the Age of Globalization, in: International Organization 51(1), 1-30. 
 
Polity IV Project 2002: Polity IV Country Report 2002, Nigeria, University of Maryland 
([http://www.cidm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Nig1.htm] Accessed 2004-01-12).  
 
Project Underground 1997a: Drillbits and Tailings. "Mind the Gap" Between Shell's Rhethoric and 
Reality, May 21, 1997 ([http://www.moles.org/index.html] Accessed 2004-01-12). 
 
Project Underground 1997b: The Ogoni Struggle. A Project Underground Report, March 4, 1997 
([http://www.moles.org/index.html] Accessed 2004-01-12).  
 
Project Underground 2000a: Drillbits and Tailings. Court decides against Shell in Nigeria as Pipeline 
Fire kills Twenty Eight, June 30, 2000 ([www.moles.org/index.html] Accessed 2004-01-12). 
 
Project Underground 2000b: Drillbits and Tailings. Violence erupts in Ogoni as Shell begins 
Operations, April 17, 2000 ([http://www.moles.org/index.html] Accessed 2004-01-12). 
 
Risse, Thomas 2000: Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics, in:  International 
Organization 54(1), 1-39. 
 
 37
Risse, Thomas 2002: Transnational Actors and World Politics, in: Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse 
and Beth A. Simmons (eds.): Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 255-274. 
 
Risse, Thomas 2003: Konstruktivismus, Rationalismus und Theorien Internationaler Beziehungen. 
Warum empirisch nichts so heiß gegessen wird, wie es theoretisch gekocht wurde, in: Hellmann, 
Gunther, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (eds.): Die neuen internationalen Beziehungen. 
Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 99-132. 
 
Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.) 1999: The Power of Human Rights. 
International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink 1999: The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms 
into Domestic Practices. Introduction, in: Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink 
(eds.): The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1-38. 
 
Rittberger, Volker, Christina Schrade and Daniela Schwarzer 1999: Introduction. Transnational Civil 
Society and the Quest for Security, in: Alagappa, Mthiah and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.):  International 
Security Management and the United Nations. The United Nations System in the 21st Century, 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 109-138. 
 
Schimmelfennig, Frank 2003: Internationale Sozialisation. Von einem "erschöpften" zu einem 
produktiven Forschungsprogramm?, in: Hellmann, Gunther, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn 
(eds.): Die neuen internationalen Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos, 401-427. 
 
Schröder, Miriam 2003: Der Verhaltenswandel in der Chinesischen Klimapolitik. Welche 
Erklärungskraft hat das Spiralmodell der Transnationalen Sozialisierung im Politikbereich Umwelt? 
Unpublished Master Thesis, Tübingen: University of Tübingen. 
 
Schwartz, Peter and Blair Gibb 1999: When Good Companies Do Bad Things. Responsibility and Risk in 
an Age of Globalization, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Shell 1995a: Press Release: Execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his Co-defendants, Statement by 
Managing Director Brian Anderson, November 14, 1995 ([http://www.shellnigeria.com/] Accessed 
2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 1995b: Press Release: Verdict on Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa and Others, October 30, 1995  
([http://www.shellnigeria.com/] Accessed 2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 1997: Shell's Statement of General Business Principles ([http://www.shell.com/] Accessed 2003-
12-20). 
 
Shell 1998a: Community Development Workshop Report ([http://www.shellnigeria.com/] Accessed 
2004-01-15). 
 
Shell 1998b: The Shell Report 1998. Profits and Principles - Does there have to be a Choice? 
([http://www.shell.com/] Accessed 2003-12-20). 
 
Shell 2001: Press Release: Major Oil Spill at SPDC's Yorla Well, May 11, 2001 
([http://www.shellnigeria.com/] Accessed 2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 2002: The Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2002: People and the Environment 
 38
([http://www.shell.com/] Accessed 2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 2003a: 3rd Quarter 2003 Results, Shell Nigeria ([www.shellnigeria.com] Accessed 2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 2003b: Monitoring and Evaluation ([www.shell.com] Accessed 2003-12-20). 
 
Shell 2003c: Press Release/Speech: The Business Case for Sustainable Development. The Shell 
Experience. A Keynote Address Presented by Chris Finlayson, Managing Director of the SPDC of 
Nigeria Limited and Chairman of Shell Companies in Nigeria at the 2003 Commonwealth Business 
Form in Abuja on December 2-4, 2003 ([www.shellnigeria.com] Accessed 2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 2003d: Press Release: Terminal Pass ISO Surveillance, Shell Nigeria ([www.shellnigeria.com] 
Accessed 2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 2003e: SPEC 2002 Integrated Environment & Community Development Stakeholders' 
Workshop Action Close-Out Report ([www.shellnigeria.com] Accessed 2004-01-05). 
 
Shell 2004: Environment Management in Nigeria ([www.shellnigeria.com] Accessed 2004-02-28). 
 
Snidal, Duncan 2002: Rational Choice and International Relations, in: Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas 
Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.): Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 73-94. 
 
Spar, Debora L. 1998: The Spotlight and the Bottom Line. How Multinationals Export Human Rights, in: 
Foreign Affairs 77(2), 7-12. 
 
Spar, Debora L. and Lane T. La Mure 2003: The Power of Activism. Assessing the Impact of NGOs on 
Global Business, in: California Management Review 45(3), 78-101. 
 
Steiner, Goerge A. and John F. Steiner 2003: Business, Government, and Society, New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
Strange, Susan 1996: The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 
Cambridge, England; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tangen, Kristian 2003: Shell. Struggling to Build a Better World, FNI Report 1/2003, Lysaker: The 
Fridtjof Nansen Institute. 
 
Transparency International (ed.) 2003: Global Corruption Report 2003, London: Pluto Press. 
 
United Nations 1998: Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any 
Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and other Dependent Countries and 
Territories. Situation of Human Rights in Nigeria, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
E/CN.4/1998/62, February 16, 1998. 
 
United Nations 2000: United Nations Millennium Declaration, United Nations, Resolution General 
Assembly, A/Res/55/2, September 18, 2000. 
 
United Nations 2002: Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 
with regard to Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights/Sub-Commission Resolution 2003/16, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 at 52 (2003), August 13, 2003.  
 
United Nations 2003: Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 
United Nations, General Assembly/Security Council, A/58/365-S/2003/888, September 12, 2003. 
 39
 
Van Evera, Stephen 1997: Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
Warhurst, Alyson 2001: Corporate Citizenship and Corporate Social Investment. Drivers of Tri-Sector 
Partnerships, in: Journal of Corporate Citizenship 1(1), 57-73. 
 
Wenger, Andreas and Daniel Möckli 2003: Conflict Prevention. The untapped Potential of the Business 
Sector, Boulder, Colo.; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Whitehouse, Lisa 2003: Corporate Social Responsibility as Citizenship and Compliance, in: Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship 3(11), 85-98. 
 
Wood, Donna J. and Jeanne M. Logsdon 2001: Theorizing Business Citizenship, in: Andriof, Jörg and 
Malcolm McIntosh (eds.): Perspectives on Corporate Citizenship, Sheffield: Greenleaf, 83-103. 
 
World Bank's Business Partners for Development Natural Resources Cluster 2002: Tri-Sector 
Partnerships for Managing Social Issues in the Extractive Industries ([www.bpd-naturalresouces.org] 
Accessed 2003-12-18). 
 
Zadek, Simon 2001: The Civil Corporation, London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
